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We experimentally analyze first- and second-price procurement auctions
where one bidder can achieve a comparative cost advantage by investment
prior to the auction. Theory predicts that bidders invest more often prior
to second-price auctions than prior to first-price auctions, which is clearly
confirmed by our experimental data. Bidding in the auction (after
investment) is more aggressive than the equilibrium prediction in both
auction formats.
1. Introduction
Different market institutions provide different incentives for firms to
engage in activities that affect their competitive positions. For example,
prior to a procurement auction investments can be made either to
reduce a firm’s own cost of production, or even to raise the cost of
possible competitors. Empirical evidence indicates that companies
make use of this possibility extensively.1 Thus, both, auction rules and
investment incentives have to be accounted for when it comes to
compare revenue and efficiency of selling (or buying) institutions.
A number of papers theoretically analyze investment incentives in
procurement auctions. Most of them assume that investment decisions
are not observable prior to a competition.2 Then, a typical finding is that
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Ricardo Martinez for valuable research assistance. We also wish to thank
seminar participants in Alicante, Istanbul (SCW 2006), Jena, Sevilla (SMYE
2006) and Valencia (EARIE 2007) for helpful comments. Financial Support
by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the Instituto Valenciano de
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1 De Silva, Dunne and Kosmopolou (2003).
2 See Tan (1992), Piccone and Tan (1996), and Bag (1997).
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investment is symmetric so that revenue equivalence between market
institutions is preserved also in a model that allows for investment.
This is not necessarily true if investment is observable. If firms stra-
tegically react to the decisions made at the investment stage, it is not
immediately clear whether ex ante symmetry implies symmetric
investment. For the case that only one firm has the possibility to invest,
first- and second-price auctions with observable investment have been
analyzed by Arozamena and Cantillon (2004). They show that equi-
librium investment is lower prior to first-price auctions than prior to
second-price auctions. The reason is that, in a first-price auction, a
bidder’s investment in his own comparative advantage makes his
opponents’ bids more aggressive. This strategic effect generally dimin-
ishes benefits from investment; it can evenmake investment undesirable.
In this chapter we experimentally investigate investment behavior
prior to first- and second-price auction markets in a framework that is
inspired by the model of Arozamena and Cantillon. Throughout the
experiment we ran procurement auctions with two subjects each.
Subjects played a two-stage game. At the first stage, one subject could
invest in order to obtain a superior distribution of cost (not investing
led to symmetry). At stage two, subjects competed in a procurement
auction that was first or second price, depending on the treatment.
As expected, we find that bidding behavior at the auction stage does
not perfectly coincide with equilibrium bidding. In the first-price
auction, bidders bid more aggressively than predicted by the risk-
neutral Nash equilibrium. In the second-price auction, about half of
the bids are close to equilibrium, while a rather large fraction of bids is
below cost. Both observations are standard in the experimental lit-
erature on auctions.3 We find, however, that the relative investment
incentives in the two auction formats are preserved given the observed
behavior at the auction stage. That is, investment incentives given the
actual play are still higher in the second-price than in the first-price
auction, although investment is less profitable than predicted in both
formats. At the investment stage we observe that, in accordance with
the theory, investment is indeed lower prior to first-price auctions than
prior to second-price auctions. Given the actual play in the auctions,
investment is too high in both formats.
3 For surveys, see Kagel (1995) and the chapter by Offerman and Onderstal in this
volume.
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To summarize, our experimental evidence clearly shows that par-
ticipants are aware of the strategic links between the investment and
the auction stage. However, observed behavior does not perfectly
coincide with the theoretical benchmark. We run two additional
treatments to study the potential influence of the (existence of an)
investment stage on bidding behavior in the auction more deeply. In
our first control treatment we run asymmetric auctions with two
players, where the strong player’s cost advantage was exogenous. In
our second control treatment the opponent’s behavior was simulated
by a computer algorithm programmed to play the (risk-neutral)
symmetric Bayes–Nash equilibrium strategy in both stages. With few
exceptions we find no significantly different investment or bidding
behavior in either of the two control treatments.
Our chapter is, to the best of our knowledge, the first experimental
study on the impact of investment on bidding behavior in procurement
auctions. We chose procurement auctions (instead of auctions) since
investment in cost reduction is a natural choice to present to partici-
pants. There are very few experimental studies of procurement auc-
tions, and thus, our study (as a byproduct) demonstrates that behavior
largely does not depend on the frame. There is, of course, a vast
experimental literature on auctions, to which our chapter relates.4,5
The experimental study which is closest to ours is Gu¨th et al. (2005),
who study asymmetric first- and second-price auctions (without an
investment stage) and afterwards elicit the participant’s preferences for
the auction format (first- or second-price auction). In this respect, their
experimental environment corresponds to our treatment with exogen-
ous investment (with the difference that they deal with a standard
auction format) and our findings in this treatment confirm theirs.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2
we introduce the theoretical model that was the basis for our
experimental design. The experimental design is presented in Section 3,
and our hypotheses in Section 4. We report the results in Section 5 and
conclude in Section 6. Experimental Instructions and Regression
Tables can be found in the Appendix.
4 Kagel (1995).
5 In this respect, our evidence mostly confirms results from the experimental lit-
erature on “standard” auctions (take, for example, more aggressive bidding on
behalf of the weak firm).
Investment incentives in auctions: an experiment 269
HINLOOPEN: 9780521493420c11 9/17/08 4:17:43pm page 269
2. Investment incentives in procurement auctions
2.1. The game
We consider a two-player, two-stage game. At stage one, one of two
firms (firm 1) can affect its relative competitive position through an
investment in cost reduction. At stage two both firms (1 and 2) compete
in a procurement auction. Production costs are privately observed by
the firms prior to the procurement auction at stage two. In the fol-
lowing we analyze behavior at both stages for two alternative auction
formats, a second-price auction (SPA) and a first-price auction (FPA).
Investment stage
At the investment stage, one of the two firms, say firm 1, can make a
decision that affects its production cost at stage two in a probabilistic
sense. Investment is a binary choice to realize or not to realize a
certain pre-specified reduction of (stage two) production cost.
Investment is costly. Investment cost k is observed only by firm 1 prior
to its investment decision. Under these assumptions, firm 1’s decision
can be formalized by an investment function df(k), where df(k)¼ 1
(df((k)¼0)denotes the decision (not) to invest when the investment
cost is k and the stage two auction format is f 2 {FPA, SPA}. If
df(k)¼ 1 (i.e. firm 1 decides to invest), its production cost at stage two,
C1, is uniformly distributed in ½c  w; c. If df((k)¼0, C1 is uniformly
distributed in ½c; c. In either case, firm 2’s production cost, C2, is
drawn uniformly from ½c; c. In other words, if firm 1 decides not to
invest, firms are symmetric at stage two. In contrast, if firm 1 invests,
its production cost is lower in the sense of first-order stochastic
dominance and firms are asymmetric at stage two.6 In this latter case,
we refer to firm 1 (2) as the strong (weak) bidder.
Auction stage
Prior to bidding in the auction, costs c1and c2 are realized according to
the relevant distribution.7 Each firm observes its own production cost,
6 Note that as we are dealing with procurement auctions, the distribution that is
first-order stochastically dominated is advantageous.
7 We denote random variables by capitals and realizations by the corresponding
lower case letters.
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but not the other firm’s cost. We consider two auction formats, a first-
price auction (FPA), and a second-price auction (SPA).
2.2. Bidding behavior, investment decisions and
equilibrium payoffs
We solve the model by backward induction, starting from stage
two. We use the same parameters as in our experimental design,
namely c ¼300, c¼ 400 and w¼ 100.8
Stage two: Equilibrium bid functions
As for SPA, bidding the observed production cost is a weakly dom-
inant strategy, independently of whether firm 1 has invested or not.
Thus, we have
bSPAi ðciÞ ¼ ci; i ¼ 1; 2; ð1Þ
where b
f
i ðciÞ is firm i0s bid function under auction format f, condi-
tional on her privately observed production cost ci.
As for FPA, equilibrium bid functions differ in the symmetric and
the asymmetric case. We focus on the risk-neutral symmetric Bayes–
Nash equilibrium. In the symmetric case (no investment by firm 1)
equilibrium bid functions, for both firms, are
bSPAi ðciÞ ¼
ðc þ ciÞ
2
; i ¼ 1; 2 ð2Þ
In the asymmetric case, equilibrium bid-functions are given by
bFPA1 ðc1Þ ¼
200ð6c1  2600þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
520000 2400ci þ 3c21
p
Þ
3ðc1  400Þ ð3Þ
bFPA2 ðc2Þ ¼
200ð6c1  2200þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2400þ 3c22  44000
p
Þ
3ðc1  400Þ ð4Þ
8 While we could solve the model also for general values of our parameters,
we believe that there is little value added by doing so. Using the parameter
configuration of the experiment moreover facilitates interpretation of the data.
All our results qualitatively also hold for different parameterizations.
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Here bFPA1 ðc1Þis the bid-function of a firm that has invested and thus,
has the more advantageous cost distribution. See Figure 11.1.
Comparison of (3) and (4) yields that the advantaged bidder should
bid point-wisely higher than the disadvantaged bidder, i.e. be less
aggressive (recall that we consider a procurement auction). This
implies that the ex ante disadvantaged bidder may sometimes win the
auction although he observed a higher cost than his opponent. Con-
sequently, the asymmetric first-price auction is inefficient with positive
probability.
Stage one: Optimal investment decision
Given the above equilibrium bid functions at stage two, we can calcu-
late the optimal investment decision at stage one. Whether it is bene-
ficial for a firm to invest or not depends on how the firm’s competitor
reacts. Consequently in order to judge the profitability of an investment,
one has to compute the equilibria at stage two for both the asymmetric
case (corresponding to df(k)¼ 1) and the symmetric case (corresponding
to df(k)¼ 0). Investment is profitable whenever investment cost is
smaller than the difference between the expected profits obtained in
the case of investing (d¼ 1) and in the case of not investing (d¼ 10). Let
k^f denote the (equilibrium) investment cost threshold, under auction
format f 2 {FPA, SPA}, below which firm 1 should invest.
40
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Figure 11.1 Equilibrium bid functions in the asymmetric FPA
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Optimal investment decision rules, for the two auction formats, are
given by
dSPAðkÞ ¼
1 if k < k^SPA ¼ 125=3
0; 1f g if k ¼ k^SPA
0 if k > k^SPA:
8<
: ð5Þ
dFPAðkÞ ¼
1 if k < k^FPA ¼ 34
0; 1f g if k ¼ k^FPA
0 if k > k^FPA:
8<
: ð6Þ
Note that, since k^FPA ¼ 34 < k^SPA ¼ 125=3  41:67, in FPA investment
is profitable for a smaller range of parameters than in SPA. The reason
for this difference is that in the first-price auction investment has a
negative strategic effect (through a change in the opponent’s bidding
behavior), which is not the case in the second-price auction. This can
be seen from equations (1) to (4). Investment has no effect on the
competitor’s bidding behavior in SPA, whereas in FPA it renders the
competitor more aggressive in Nash-equilibrium. The reason is that
firm 2 (the firm with the “worse” cost distribution) expects tougher
competition in the auction than firm 1. Thus, in FPA investment has a
drawback, since it makes the opponent relatively more aggressive.
Bidders’ equilibrium payoffs
Let us finally present the bidders’ equilibrium payoffs in our two
auction formats. Payoff here means overall payoff of the entire game,
including the investment stage. Obviously this payoff will depend on
the cost threshold k^f , as well as the cost of investment k and the
format of the auction. In Table 11.1 we summarize the firms’ expected
equilibrium payoffs in the first-price and in the second-price auction.
Note that in the symmetric case, both formats yield the same
expected payoffs.9 In the second-price auction, investment by firm 1
decreases firm 2’s payoff considerably, whereas in the first-price
auction, bidder 2 even benefits from firm 1’s investment. This is due to
the negative strategic effect of investment.
9 This is due to the revenue equivalence theorem, see e. g. Myerson (1981).
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3. The experimental design
The experimentwas conducted in seven sessions inMay, 2005.A total of
168 students (24 per session) were recruited among the student popu-
lation of the University of Alicante – mainly undergraduate students
from the Economics Department with no (or very little) prior exposure
to game theory. All monetary payoffs in the experiment were expressed
in Spanish pesetas (e1 is approximately 166 ptas.).10 Average earnings
were about e18.5, for an approximately 90-minute experiment.
Table 11.2 shows our six different treatments. FPA and SPA are the
initial treatments with endogenous investment. In treatments EXFPA
and EXSPA the asymmetries that could be induced by investment in
the first two treatments were exogenously given. In COMPFPA and
COMPSPA the opponent of each player was played by a computerized
agent.11
We ran two sessions each of FPA and SPA and one session each of
EXFPA and EXSPA, generating six and three independent observations
per treatment, respectively (compare Table 11.2). As for COMPFPA
and COMPSPA we ran one session only where twelve participants
played each auction format, yielding twelve independent observations.
Table 11.1. Equilibrium payoffs
FPA SPA
firm 1 firm 2 firm 1 firm 2
df (k)¼ 1 50.6 – k 19.4 58.3 – k 8.3
df (k)¼ 0 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6
10 It is standard practice, for all experiments run in Alicante, to use Spanish ptas.
as experimental currency. The reason for this design choice is twofold. First, it
mitigates integer problems, compared with other currencies (USD or Euros, for
example). On the other hand, although Spanish pesetas are no longer in use
(substituted by the Euro in the year 2001), Spanish people still use Pesetas to
express monetary values in their everyday life. In this respect, by using a “real”
(as a opposed to an artificial) currency, we avoid the problem of framing the
incentive structure of the experiment using a scale (e.g. “Experimental Cur-
rency”) with no cognitive content.
11 In the treatment with computerized opponents participants were informed that
the computer is preprogrammed to play an optimal strategy.
274 Veronika Grimm et al.
HINLOOPEN: 9780521493420c11 9/17/08 4:17:59pm page 274
The seven experimental sessions were computerized.12 Written
instructions were distributed at the beginning of the experiment and
read aloud. At the end of the instructional phase, participants had to
answer a set of control questions, to make sure that they had properly
understood the key features of the experiment.13
In each session, participants played one of the six treatments for a
total forty-four rounds. In the first six sessions, participants were
divided into three cohorts of eight. Participants from different cohorts
never interacted with each other throughout the experiment. In each
round, participants from a cohort were randomly matched in pairs of
two, where each subject played as firm 1 (2) every other round. This
was done to enhance the subjects’ understanding of strategic effects of
investment decisions. Let time interval sm be the m-th block of eleven
rounds such that s1 refers to rounds 1–11, s2 refers to rounds 12 to 22,
and so on. Within each time interval sm, participants acting as firm 1
experienced each and every possible investment cost of k 2 {0, 5, . . . ,
45, 50} ptas. The sequence of costs was randomly selected within each
time interval and was different for each cohort and period. After being
told the current investment cost k, firm 1 had to decide whether to
invest. By this design, we are able to characterize four complete
investment functions df ðkÞ, one for each time interval.
Table 11.2. The experimental treatments
First-price auction Second-price auction
Stage 1: Investment FPA SPA
Stage 2: Auction (6 indep. observations) (6 indep. observations)
Exogenous advantage EXFPA EXSPA
Asymmetric auction (3 indep. observations) (3 indep. observations)
Stage 1: Investment
Stage 2: Auction against COMPFPA COMPSPA
computerized agent (12 indep. observations) (12 indep. observations)
12 The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007).
13 The instructions for FPA, translated into English, can be found in the Appendix.
Instructions for the remaining treatments are available upon request.
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Participants participating in the experiment initially received 1,000
ptas. These stakes were chosen to exclude the possibility of bank-
ruptcy. Within each round, each subject received an additional fixed
endowment of 10 ptas., while only those who had the opportunity to
invest additionally received a fixed payment equivalent to the invest-
ment cost k that they had in the current round.14
After each of the forty-four rounds, participants were informed of
the identity of the stage two auction winner and her own monetary
payoffs, as well as all the accumulated monetary payoff so far. The
same information was also given in the form of a history table, so that
participants could easily review the results of all the rounds that had
been played so far.
4. Hypotheses and research questions
The theoretical analysis of Section 2 yields the following working
hypotheses for our experiment.
(H1) Bidding behavior. Irrespective of the treatments we expect the
following bidding behavior at stage two:
(i) In FPA we expect bidding behavior of strong bidders to be
less aggressive than that of weak bidders in the sense that,
for any given level of the production cost c, the strong
bidder’s bid should be higher.
(ii) In SPA, both strong and weak firms should always bid their
production cost c.
(H2) Payoffs.
(i) In treatments FPA, SPA, COMPFPA andCOMPSPA, if firm1
does not invest, firms’ payoffs should be the same. This is a
consequence of the revenue equivalence theorem, since, in
this case, bidders are symmetric.15
(ii) In all treatments, if firm 1 invests, her profits should be higher
than firm 2’s, and also higher than in the symmetric case.
14 The role of this addition nal payment is to ensure that a bidder who had
invested in FPA (SPA) had the same wealth as a bidder who received the
advantage for free in EXFPA (EXSPA). Also the risk of bankruptcy is reduced.
15 This argument does not apply for EXFPA (EXSPA) where, by construction, all
auctions are asymmetric. Also note that revenue equivalence can only be
expected conditional on the fact that no investment has taken place.
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Compared to the symmetric case, firm 2’s profits in the
asymmetric case are lower (higher) in SPA (FPA). From the
auctioneer’s point of view, FPA yields a lower procurement
cost than SPA (for our particular parametrization).16
(H3) Investment behavior. Investment incentives are higher in treat-
ments SPA and COMPSPA than in treatments FPA, COMPFPA.
This is because, by (5)-(6), firm 1’s optimal “threshold” strategy
anticipates that, in FPA, firm 2 will bid more aggressively in
reaction to firm 1’s investment (something that does not happen
in SPA).
(H4) Efficiency. By (1), the SPA outcome is efficient, independently of
whether bidders are asymmetric or not. By contrast, in FPA, the
allocation is predicted to be efficient only if firm 1 has not
invested (i.e. when bidders face a symmetric auction).
In addition, by comparing treatments FPA and SPA to our four control
treatments, we will try to answer the following (more behaviorally
oriented) questions:
(HB1) Does the origin of the comparative advantage matter? That
is, does the existence of the investment stage per se affect
behavior at the auction stage?
(HB2) How does the strategic uncertainty affect participants’beha-
vior? That is, do participants behave differently in treatments
FPA (SPA) and COMPFPA (COMPSPA) because of strategic
uncertainty?
5. Experimental results
In this section we report our experimental results. We first test our
main hypotheses, H1 to H4, based on the evidence from treatments
FPA and SPA in Sections 5.1 to 5.4.Then, in Section 5.5, we report
evidence from the remaining four treatments to discuss whether and
how the existence of an investment stage affects behavior, apart from
what is theoretically predicted.
16 In general, revenues do not compare in an unambiguous way in asymmetric
auctions. See Maskin and Riley (2000).
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5.1. Bidding behavior (H1)
Bidding behavior in the symmetric auctions (no investment) resembles
very much what has been found in the experimental literature so far.
In what follows we concentrate on the bidding behavior if the bidders
have invested.
Fpa
Figures 11.2, 11.3 and 11.4 describe the participants’ bidding behavior
in FPA.We take three snapshots of the data: in Figure 11.2 (3) we plot a
scatter diagram of player 1’s (2’s) bidding behavior after investment
took place in stage one. In Figure 11.4 we report participants’ bidding
behavior (irrespective of their player position) if investment did not
take place.
Figures 11.2 to 11.4 share the same structure. Every point of the
scatter diagram corresponds to a cost–bid pair (i.e., an individual
observation). The two continuous lines correspond to (i) the equilib-
rium bid function derived in Section 2 and (ii) production cost c
(which corresponds to the lower bound for any rationalizable bid).
As Figures 11.2 to 11.4 show, participants generally bid above cost,
but below the equilibrium prediction, which is in line with most
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Figure 11.2 Bidding behavior in FPA, firm 1
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Figure 11.3 Bidding behavior in FPA, firm 2
40
0
35
0
30
0
25
0
20
0
300 320 340 360 380 400
cost
Observed Bids cost
NE in FPA inv=0
bi
d
Figure 11.4 Bidding behavior in FPA, symmetric case
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experimental findings.17 After investing at stage one, firm 1 should be
aware of the fact that firm 2’s cost can never fall below 300. As a
matter of fact, as Figure 11.2 shows, b1 ¼ 300 seems to be a “focal
bid” for cost realizations below 300.18 Over time bidders seem to
learn to bid somewhat closer to equilibrium, although this (learning)
effect is not significant.
To estimate participants’ aggregate bid functions, we employ, for
all treatments, the same simple random effects linear regression. The
underlying model assumes that participants use bid functions that are
two-piecewise linear, with a structural break fixed at c ¼ 300:
bit ¼ a0 þ b0cit þ a1d1 þ b1d1cit þ a2d1dcþ þ b2d1dcþcit
þ ei þ eit
ð7Þ
where d1 ¼ 1ðd1 ¼ 0Þ if firm 1 has (not) invested at stage one, dcþ ¼ 1
ðdcþ ¼ 0Þ if c (<)300, ei is the individual (random) component
which describes subject i’s unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity
and eit is an idiosyncratic error term.
Table 11A.1 (in the appendix) reports the estimation results for
regression (7) in the case of treatments FPA and SPA.19, 20 Comparing
the estimated bid functions with our theoretical prediction we notice
that our estimated bid functions are always (point-wisely) significantly
different from their corresponding equilibrium levels. In particular,
for both, firm 1 and firm 2, bidding behavior is always more aggres-
sive than predicted, as the estimated bid functions are always (point-
wisely) significantly below equilibrium. Moreover (which is consistent
with theory), firm 2 behaves more aggressively than firm 1 in the
17 See, for example, Kagel (1995), or, for asymmetric auctions, Gu¨th et al. (2005).
18 This consideration notwithstanding, we also see a significant proportion of bids
below 300 (6.2% of total observations), although these observations mainly
correspond to the first periods (i.e. in time interval 4, only 2.7% of total
observations were bids below 300).
19 We also included time dummies for our four time intervals sm, m¼ 1, . . . , 4.
The corresponding coefficients (also for interaction terms) turned out not to be
significant. I.e., we observe no particular time trends in either direction.
20 The estimation of the variance-covariance matrix of (7) has been adjusted to
control for possible correlation among observations drawn from the same
matching group. In other words, our estimations are performed under the
assumption that the history of each matching group (and not the history
of the eight participants that form each matching group) corresponds to an
independent observation.
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asymmetric auction. As for firm 1, we observe that bidding behavior is
somewhat “closer” to equilibrium when c<300, i.e. the difference
between theoretical and estimated bids for c<300 is much smaller
than the corresponding difference for c300 (30.9 versus 42.88). This
evidence seems to suggest that, whenever investment yields a domin-
ant position for firm 1 (i.e. production cost c<300), firm 1’s bidding is
comparatively less aggressive than when investment does not yield
such a clear cooperative cost advantage.
Spa
Figures 11.5, 11.6 and 11.7 report the same information as Figures
11.2 to 11.4 for the SPA sessions. As Figures 11.5 to 11.7 show, bidding
behavior is much noisier in SPA than in FPA, in particular (for both
player positions) after firm 1 has invested in stage 1. As a consequence,
the fit of our linear regressions in Table 11A.1 (overallR2¼ 0.5427 for
firm 1 and 0.5127 for firm 2 in FPA, against 0.4294 and 0.1295 in the
SPA case, respectively), drops dramatically. This translates into much
higher standard errors in the estimated coefficients. This consideration
notwithstanding, we see that, once again, participants bid below
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Figure 11.5 Bidding behavior in SPA, firm 1
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Figure 11.6 Bidding behavior in SPA, firm 2
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Figure 11.7 Bidding behavior in SPA, symmetric case
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equilibrium (i.e. they behave more aggressively than predicted), and
this difference is (point-wisely) statistically significant.21
Such lower levels of R2 “between participants”, calls for further
analysis of our evidence, looking at whether high variance in the data
has to be attributed to heterogeneity in our subject pool, rather than
heterogeneous responses (of each single individual participating in the
experiment) to similar cost levels. As it turns out, participants were
indeed quite heterogeneous. Roughly speaking, they can be classified
in four types: (i) those who played equilibrium from the very begin-
ning (27%), (ii) those who learned how to play the equilibrium over
time (25%), (iii) those who consistently underbid throughout (31%),
and (iv) thosewho alternate over- and underbidding across time (17%).
Table 11.3 summarizes the proportions of bids equal to observed
cost þ/– 1%, above and below, respectively. As Table 11.3 shows, the
percentage of bids close to the theoretical prediction mildly increased
over time. Still, more than half of the bidders over- or underbid their
cost even in time interval 4, where the vast majority underbid their
cost (i.e. run the risk to incur a loss). Over all time intervals, we
observe 8.9% of bids below 200, and an additional 24.76% of bids
between 200 and 300 that were more than 10% below the corres-
ponding cost. A large proportion of the extremely low bids (below
200 ptas.) were made by three bidders only. In addition, the number
of bids below 200 is much higher in the case where player 1 had
invested. Then, there are 14.6% firm 1 bids and 6.4% firm 2 bids in
this range. In the symmetric case, there are only 3% bids by firm 1 and
3.5% bids by firm 2 below 200.
The observed behavior at the auction stage is in line with the
experimental literature. For example, Gu¨th et al. (2005) report that
Table 11.3. Proportions of equilibrium bids and over-/underbidding
in SPA when d¼1
underbidding equilibrium bidding overbidding
< cost – 1 % ¼ cost þ/- 1 % > cost þ 1 %
all periods 49.76 % 41.34 % 8.90 %
time interval 4 46.21 % 47.35 % 6.44 %
21 This is in line with previous experimental evidence on the second-price auction.
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half of their participants bid approximately truthfully. Underbidding
in their experiment was slightly less prominent. They argue that this is
due to the fact that in their experiments participants had previously
gained experience because they had to participate in several first-price
auctions prior to playing SPA.
Result 1 (bidding behavior)
(i) In FPA bidding is more aggressive than the equilibrium prediction
for all types.
(ii) In SPA bidding behavior is highly heterogeneous. While
approximately half of the subjects bid their cost or learn to do so
over time, 50% of subjects over- or underbid considerably, where
underbidding is by far the most prominent pattern.
5.2. Payoffs (H2)
Table 11.4 contains information about average bidder payoffs in FPA
and SPA from the auction at the second stage. Investment costs are not
taken into account. (This is because investment costs are sunk at this
stage and should not affect payoffs in the auction.)
In the symmetric case (i.e. when d¼0), there are no significant dif-
ferences between FPA and SPA, as predicted by the revenue equivalence
theorem. In both the symmetric and the asymmetric auctions, however,
participants bid much more aggressively than predicted, with the
consequence that payoffs are lower than their theoretical values.
Table 11.4. Observed and equilibrium payoffs in FPA and SPA
FPA SPA
firm 1 firm 2 firm 1 firm 2
observed 29.097 2.261 36.007 -3.160
d¼1 (std. dev.) (41.673) (18.492) (57.775) (32.256)
equilibrium 50.6 19.4 58.3 8.3
observed 5.053 6.196 6.693 6.465
d¼0 (std. dev.) (18.337) (16.940) (28.143) (25.844)
equilibrium 16.6 16.6 16.6 16.6
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In the asymmetric auctions (i.e. when d¼1), firm 1’s payoff is sig-
nificantly higher in SPA than in FPA. While, as predicted, firm 2’s
payoff is significantly higher in FPA than in SPA, also for firm 2 actual
payoffs are dramatically lower than their theoretical predictions. In
SPA, firm 2’s average payoff is even negative (which is due to the
excessive underbidding of valuations reported in the previous section).
In FPA, firm 2’s payoff should theoretically be higher than either
firm’s payoff in the symmetric case. However, in our experiment the
opposite is true. This is presumably due to the extremely aggressive
behavior of weak bidders in the FPA format.
Note that comparison of the symmetric and the asymmetric payoffs
determines whether investment at stage one is profitable or not.
Investment is profitable whenever the investor’s additional expected
payoff in case of investment is higher than investment cost. The
aggregate data (over all time intervals) suggest that investment
incentives given the observed behavior are lower than their theoretical
prediction. The critical investment cost suggested by aggregate data is
24.044 (theoretical prediction: 34) for FPA and 29.314 (theoretical
prediction: 41.667) for SPA. Still, according to the observed payoff
differences the relative profitability of investment (which theoretically
is higher in the second-price auction) is preserved.
Table 11.5 finally reports the procurement cost in all four auction
types together with their theoretical predictions. As expected, pro-
curement cost in both formats is significantly lower if an investment
has been made. Revenue equivalence (i.e. the hypothesis that pro-
curement cost in SPA equals procurement cost in FPA) has to be
rejected at the 5% level in either case, d¼ 1 and d¼ 0.
Table 11.5. Procurement cost in FPA and SPA
FPA SPA
observed 327.630 333.024
d¼1 (std. dev.) (33.819) (44.620)
equilibrium 354.1 358.3
observed 348.074 353.931
d¼0 (std. dev.) (24.985) (32.177)
equilibrium 366.7 366.7
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Result 2 (payoffs)
(i) Bidder payoffs are significantly lower than their theoretical pre-
dictions, both in the symmetric and the asymmetric auctions. In
the symmetric auctions payoffs do not differ between FPA and
SPA. In the asymmetric auctions bidder payoffs are higher in SPA
than in FPA for firm 1 and vice versa for firm 2.
(ii) Procurement cost is lower in the asymmetric than in the sym-
metric auction and among the asymmetric auctions lower in FPA.
5.3. Investment behavior (H3)
As theory predicts, our subjects’ investment behavior was influenced
by both the investment cost k as well as the auction format (FPA or
SPA), where the probability of investment was significantly higher in
SPA. This seems to suggest that players were able to estimate that the
value of such an investment is higher on average in SPA than in FPA.
In SPA the majority of subjects invested for almost any level of k at the
beginning of the experiment. That is, they invested “too much” both
with respect to equilibrium behavior and expected returns, given
bidding behavior at stage 2. In later rounds they gradually reduced
their propensity to invest, and aggregate behavior became close to the
theoretical prediction.
Table 11.6 reports the predicted cost thresholds as predicted by a
logit regression. Estimated thresholds reported in the table indicate the
maximum cost level for which “not invest” corresponds to the modal
decision.
As Table 11.6 shows, predicted cost thresholds decrease over time
until they reach 35.88 in FPA and 43.60 in SPA. Whereas in the first
Table 11.6. Predicted cost thresholds from a logit regression for both
FPA and SPA
s1 s2 s3 4 prediction
FPA 46.71 39.42 34.93 35.88 34
Threshold given observed bids 15.18 22.78 31.41 26.18
SPA 50 50 44.20 43.60 41.67
Threshold given observed bids 32.12 26.12 30.22 41.65
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twenty-two rounds of FPA and the first thirty-three rounds of SPA it is
significantly higher than the threshold bidders should have had, given
the actual bidding behavior at stage 2 (see Table 11.6), it is close to
this threshold for all other rounds. The two threshold values (i.e. the
actual threshold and the optimal threshold given average observed
behavior) display a tendency to converge towards the end of the
experiment.
Result 3 (investment)
Investment starts out at high levels and over time approaches the
theoretical prediction as well as the threshold given the observed
behavior.
5.4 Efficiency (H4)
According to the equilibrium prediction, all auctions but the asym-
metric FPA should yield an efficient allocation. That is, the bidder
with the lower cost should win the auction. Because costs were ran-
domly and independently drawn in our experiment, simply comparing
treatments with respect to the achieved production cost would be
biased by these random draws. For this reason, we compare the
auction formats with respect to three different efficiency measures that
are aimed to minimize this bias:
 Allocative efficiency: the number of efficiently allocated units
(i.e. to the bidder with the lower cost) relative to the total number
of units.
 Relative efficiency loss: the loss in terms of total production cost
relative to the maximum possible efficiency loss.
 Relative efficiency: the minimal possible production cost relative to
the achieved total production cost.
Allocative efficiency does not reflect the actual magnitude of efficiency
losses due to misallocations. If the “wrong” bidder obtains a unit, his
cost may be substantially or only slightly above the other bidder’s
cost, raising production cost either dramatically or only slightly. Our
second and third measures take this into account. In Table 11.7 we
report for each measure aggregate results over all pairs and time
intervals, as well as for time interval 4.
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We observe that allocative efficiency (the percentage of Pareto-
efficient allocations) is lower in the asymmetric second-price auction
than in the first-price auction. However, the difference disappears if
one considers only time interval 4. Thus, while the erratic behavior of
many subjects in SPA seems to partly disappear over time, allocative
efficiency stays constant in the asymmetric first-price auction, where it
coincides with the equilibrium prediction. The effect appears more
pronounced if we look at the relative efficiency loss. Here, the effi-
ciency loss increases in FPA, while it decreases remarkably in the
asymmetric second-price auction.
The remarkably low efficiency values especially for the symmetric
SPA may be due to a small sample size together with a self-selection
problem: since in SPA investment was almost always profitable, the
group that played the symmetric SPA may have contained a large
fraction of subjects that did not understand this. Overall, the efficiency
rates are remarkably close to those found by Gu¨th et al. (2005), again
accounting for the fact that their SPA-players were more experienced
than ours.
Result 4 (efficiency)
Efficiency is initially lower in the asymmetric SPA than in the asym-
metric FPA. Over the course of the experiment, this result is reversed.
Table 11.7. Efficiency, measured by allocative efficiency,
relative efficiency loss and relative efficiency
Periods
Allocative
efficiency
Relative
efficiency loss
Relative
efficiency
FPA all 85.99 % 8.46% 98.08 %
d¼1 34 – 44 (s4) 86.21 % 9.66 % 97.82 %
SPA all 78.88 % 14.16 % 96.83 %
d¼1 34 – 44 (s4) 86.17 % 6.65 % 98.40 %
FPA all 83.62 % 10.04 % 98.98 %
d¼0 34 – 44 (s4) 85.56 % 9.03 % 99.08 %
SPA all 73.59 % 20.46 % 98.01 %
d¼0 34 – 44 (s4) 73.33 % 21.66 % 97.97 %
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5.5. Robustness of the results
Does the origin of the comparative advantage matter? (HB1)
To answer this question we ran two treatments (EXFPA and EXSPA)
where bidders played an asymmetric auction without a preceding
investment stage. That is, firm 1 had cost uniformly distributed in
[200, 400], while firm 2’s cost distribution was uniform in [300, 400].
This is exactly the situation subjects faced in our original treatments in
case the investor actually decided to invest. Theoretically, thus, bid-
ders should behave identically in EXFPA (EXSPA) and FPA (SPA).
Our data largely confirm the theoretical hypothesis.
Table 11A.2 (in the Appendix) reports estimates of a two-piecewise
linear bid function of firm 1 and 2, pooling (in case of investment on
behalf of firm 1) observations from FPA (SPA) and EXFPA (EXSPA).
We only find a significant (point-wise) difference in the estimated bid
functions for firm 1 in SPA when c is sufficiently high (c>317
approx.). In all other cases, subjects do not behave differently in either
treatment protocol. In particular in a first-price auction, the existence
of an investment stage does not per se affect behavior in the auction.
How does the strategic uncertainty affect subjects’ behavior? (HB2)
We address the second question by comparing our results with those
coming from treatments COMPFPA and COMPSPA, where subjects
bid against computerized agents playing the RNNE strategy described
in Section 2 at both stages.
Table 11A.3 (in the Appendix) reports estimates analogous to those
of Table 11A.2 only for those observations for which investment took
place. Again, we find no significant differences for the first-price
auction, while in second-price auctions firm 1 bids significantly less
aggressively (i.e. closer to the equilibrium prediction) in COMPSPA
than in SPA for sufficiently high cost levels.
Recall, however, that bidders are rather heterogeneous in SPA and
therefore, the bid function of a representative agent might not reflect
the behavior of many players. A categorization in bidding types reveals
that there are more “rational” players (i.e. types that play equilibrium
from the beginning or learn to do so over time) in both control treat-
ments (EXSPA and COMPSPA) than in SPA (see Table 11.8).
This also reflects in the rates of bidders who bid their cost, and over/
underbid, respectively (see Table 11.9). Obviously it is not the
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strategic uncertainty that drives the difference, since in COMPSPA
bidders do not bid truthfully more frequently than in EXSPA. A
possible explanation could be that players learn the optimal strategy
better whenever a) they play against more rational players (as is the
case in COMSPA) and b) whenever they face a smaller strategy space
and thus a smaller “cognitive load” (as is the case in EXSPA).
6. Conclusion
In this chapter we have experimentally investigated behavior in first-
and second-price procurement auctions where one bidder had the
possibility to improve his competitive position by investing. Our
results are in line with several qualitative predictions of the theory. In
particular, we observe that:
 Subjects invest more often prior to SPA than prior to FPA. Over
time investment levels approach the theoretical prediction, as well
as the optimal threshold given the observed data.
Table 11.8. Bidder types in SPA (EQ: subjects who bid
their cost from the beginning, L: those who learned the
equilibrium over time, U: those who always underbid,
U/O: those who alternated under and overbidding)
EQ L U U/O
SPA 27 % 25 % 31 % 17 %
EXOSPA 37.5 % 29.2 % 20.8 % 12.5 %
COMPSPA 41.6 % 25 % 25 % 8.3 %
Table 11.9. Proportions of equilibrium bids and over-/underbidding
for the three SPA treatments – all periods
treatment underbidding equilibrium bidding overbidding
< cost – 1 % ¼ cost þ/- 1 % > cost þ 1 %
SPA 49.76 % 41.34 % 8.90 %
EXSPA 33.62 % 55.68 % 10.70 %
COMPSPA 42.23 % 51.51 % 6.25 %
290 Veronika Grimm et al.
HINLOOPEN: 9780521493420c11 9/17/08 4:18:09pm page 290
 Procurement cost is lower in the asymmetric FPA than in the
asymmetric SPA (and bidder payoffs are also lower in FPA).
 In FPA, weak bidders bid relatively more aggressively than strong
bidders.
 In those cases where investment had taken place, efficiency is initially
lower in SPA. This turns around in the course of the experiment such
that finally efficiency is lower in FPA than in SPA, as predicted.
In line with the experimental literature on auctions, we find that in
FPA, bidding is more aggressive than predicted, resulting in very low
bidder payoffs and procurement cost. In SPA, bidders are highly
heterogeneous with approximately half of them playing close to the
equilibrium prediction, while the majority of the remaining subjects
underbid. On average this also leads to lower bidder payoffs and
procurement cost in SPA.
Our results yield several conclusions for public policy. Obviously, if
investment prior to the auction is important or if positive synergies
between auctions exist it is not immediately obvious whether first- or
second-price auctions are better suited for public procurement. First-
price auctions are typically easier understood by the subjects, yield
low procurement cost (since bidders bid persistently more aggressively
than predicted), and are less susceptible to collusion than second-price
auctions. Second-price auctions, on the other hand, imply higher
investment incentives. Thus, if improvement of production technolo-
gies or process innovations are important, second-price auctions are
likely the better choice. Our analysis (as many other experiments)
demonstrates, however, that the second-price auction format has to be
carefully chosen, as typically a large share of subjects do not easily
understand the equilibrium strategy.
Appendix A: Optimal investment
Second-price auction
To find the optimal investment decision rule in the second-price
auction, we solve the model backwards. Note that the expected payoff
of a player 1 is given by
BðdSPAÞ ¼ —1EðC2  C1jC1<C2Þ ð9Þ
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where E denotes the expectations operator and —1 denotes the
probability for player 1 to win the auction.22 Obviously both —1 and
will EðC2  C1jC1 < C2Þ depend on whether an investment was
undertaken. Furthermore it is clear that the optimality of such an
investment will depend on whether its cost k is higher or lower than
the expected gains it promises. Evaluating (9) in the two cases
dSPA ¼ 1and dSPA ¼ 1 yields
Bð0Þ ¼ ðc  cÞ
6
and
Bð1Þ ¼ 7ðc  cÞ
12
 k;
respectively. Investing will be optimal whenever B(1)>B(0). Conse-
quently, the optimal investment decision is:
dSPAðkÞ ¼
1 if k < k^SPA ¼ 125=3
0; 1f g if k ¼ k^SPA
0 if k>k^SPA:
8<
:
First-price auction
Analogously, the optimal investment decision in the first-price auction
is obtained by looking at the expected profits in the auction, which are
given by
BðdFPAÞ ¼ —1Eðb1ðC1Þ  C1jC1 < C2Þ ð10Þ
Here is the advantaged bidder’s bid-function as given by (3) in the case
where dSPA ¼ 1and by (2) in the case where dSPA ¼ 0. It follows in an
analogous way to the above that the optimal investment rule is given by
dFPAðkÞ ¼
1 if k < k^FPA ¼ 34
0; 1f g if k ¼ k^FPA
0 if k>k^FPA:
8<
:
22 Obviously it is without loss of generality to assume that player 1 has the right to
invest.
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Appendix B: Instructions (FPA treatment)
Welcome to the experiment! This is an experiment to study behavior
of people making decisions. We are only interested in observing how
people act on average, not how you act personally. So do not think
that we expect you to behave in any particular way. Be aware that
your behavior will affect the amount of money you win in this
experiment. Thus, it is profitable for you to act in the best way pos-
sible. On the following pages you find the instructions on how this
experiment works and how to use the computer during the experi-
ment. The instructions are the same for all participants in the
experiment.
Please, do not disturb the other participants during the experiment.
If you need any help, please raise your hand and wait silently. We will
attend you as soon as possible.
How to win money. At the beginning of the experiment, you receive
1000 ptas just for participation. At the end of the experiment you are
paid the amount of money you have won during the experiment in
addition to these 1000 ptas.
The game
You play 44 rounds of the simple game we explain in the following. In
every round you play against another PLAYER from this room. This
PLAYER will change in every round. Neither you know whether you
have already interacted with nor does the other PLAYER know
whether he has already interacted with you. This means that your
decisions are anonymous at all times.
At the beginning of each round you receive an initial endowment
that can be different in different rounds. Every round of the game
consists of two phases, an investment phase and a procurement auc-
tion phase. Money you can only win in the procurement auction. The
investment phase only enables one of the two PLAYERS to achieve an
advantage in the procurement auction. The rounds (remember: every
round consists of two phases) are completely independent and nothing
you do in one particular round will influence any of the other rounds.
In the investment phase only one of the two players has the
opportunity to make an investment at a certain expenditure. The
investment will lead the player that has invested to have an advan-
tageous distribution of costs (we explain later on in detail what that
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means). You have the opportunity to invest every two rounds. In the
other rounds the other PLAYER has the opportunity to invest.
In the procurement auction, you and the other PLAYER compete
for the right to undertake a project. You have to bid in order to
determine the winner of the procurement auction and the price to be
paid to the winner for undertaking the project. The PLAYER who
places the lower bid wins. Realization of the project is costly. This cost
will change in every round. It is chosen according to a distribution.
Your distribution is the initial distribution if you did not invest (or if
did not have the opportunity to invest) and it is the advantageous
distribution if you did invest.
If you win the procurement auction, your profit will be the price
that is paid to undertake the project less the cost of undertaking it.
The investment phase. In the investment phase only one of the two
PLAYERS (either the other PLAYER or you) has the opportunity to
invest. If the PLAYER who can invest does so, he has the advanta-
geous cost distribution in the procurement auction, while the other
one has the initial distribution. If the PLAYER who has the oppor-
tunity to invest decides not to do so, both players have the initial
distribution.
Now we explain in more detail what it means to have an advan-
tageous distribution.
If the PLAYER who has the possibility to invest decided not to do
so, both PLAYERS have the initial distribution. This means that each
PLAYER has cost between 300 and 400 ptas, where all numbers in
this interval are equally likely.
If the PLAYER who has the opportunity to invest did so, this
PLAYER has the advantageous distribution. This means that the
PLAYER has cost between 200 and 400 ptas, where again all numbers
in this interval are equally likely.
Note that whenever you invest you have a higher probability to
have a low cost, which may lead to a higher probability to make more
profits in the competition.
In any case the PLAYER who could not invest has the initial dis-
tribution, i.e. cost between 300 and 400 ptas.
Investment is costly. The investment expenditure is different in
every round and will only be known to the PLAYER who can
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undertake the investment. This is why in every round the PLAYER
has to decide again whether the investment seems profitable to him or
not. If he decides to invest, the investment expenditure is deducted
from the initial endowment he has received at the beginning of the
round.
In every round, before the procurement auction, both PLAYERS
will be informed about whether the investment has been undertaken
or not.
The procurement auction. In the second phase of each round both
PLAYERS participate in a procurement auction for an imaginary
project. In every round, the cost of undertaking the project is deter-
mined randomly for each of the PLAYERS according to his distribu-
tion (advantageous or initial). If the PLAYER has the initial
distribution his cost is between 300 and 400 ptas. Each number in this
interval is equally likely. If he has the advantageous distribution his
cost is between 200 and 400 ptas. Again, each number in this interval
has the same probability to appear.
Before you decide about your bid, the cost you have in this round
appears on your screen. It indicates the amount of money you have to
spend to undertake the project (in case you win). The other PLAYER
will not be able to observe your cost, nor will you be able to observe
his cost. You and the other PLAYER have to decide on your bids,
knowing only your own cost and the distribution of cost of the other
PLAYER. Who gets the project, and how much money you win
depends on your bids as follows.
The procurement auction is always won by the PLAYER who offers
to undertake the project at the lower cost, i. e. the player that places
the lower bid. The winner is paid his bid. Consequently one can
interpret the bid of a player as the amount of money for which he
would be willing to undertake the project. Remember that under-
taking the project is costly (you observed this cost before placing your
bid). The PLAYER who wins the procurement auction has to pay this
cost upon undertaking the project. This means that the winner only
makes a positive profit from the procurement auction if the price he
receives is higher than his cost.
The losing player receives no payment in the procurement auction
and incurs no cost.
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What does it mean to have an “advantageous or initial distribution”?
We would like you to focus once more on what it means to have
an advantageous or initial distribution of cost in the procurement
auction. Having the initial distribution means that any number
between 300 and 400 ptas has the same probability to appear as
your cost in this round. With the advantageous distribution, every
number between 200 and 400 ptas will have the same probability to
appear.
advantageous
distribution
initial
distribution
The probability 400 ptas 100% 100%
to have cost 350 ptas 75% 50%
lower than 300 ptas 50% 0%
250 ptas 25% 0%
As you can see in the table the probability to have cost of less then 350
ptas is 50% with the initial distribution. While with the advantageous
distribution the probability to have a cost of less than 350 ptas is
higher, namely 75%.
Note that if you have the advantageous distribution there is a
probability of 50% to have a cost of less then 300 ptas. In this case
your cost will be lower than the other player’s cost for sure (he has the
initial distribution and thus, a cost between 300 and 400 ptas).
Observe that having the advantageous distribution does not
necessarily imply that you have a lower cost than the other PLAYER.
You will only have a higher probability than with the initial distri-
bution that this is the case. Having a lower cost allows the PLAYER
to place a lower bid and thus, have a higher probability of winning.
Still the identity of the winner and the profits depends on BOTH
bids.23
23 The instructions were followed by a number of control questions, and, there-
after, a short summary of the rules.
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Appendix C: Estimation results
Table 11A.1. Random effects linear regression for treatments FPA
and SPA (see equation (7))
FPA SPA
Bid firm 1 firm 2 firm 1 firm 2
126.66*** 139.68*** 80.63** 88.65**
a0 (16.66) (12.43) (33.95) (35.35)
0.67*** 0.64*** 0.68*** 0.69*
b0 (0.05) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10)
135.14*** 32.84** 21.56 12.62
a1 (19.57) (15.04) (38.01) (39.69)
0.46*** 0.08* 0.13 0.01
b1 (0.06) (0.04) (0.12) (0.11)
103.41*** – 35.07 –
a2 (18.85) – (30.70) –
0.37*** – 0.04 –
b2 (0.06) – (0.10) –
ru 7.35 7.28 28.02 31.67
re 23.99 18.39 41.28 43.46
q 0.09 0.14 0.32 0.35
R2 within 0.54 0.55 0.50 0.19
R2 between 0.58 0.11 0.27 0.0
R2 overall 0.54 0.51 0.42 0.13
Table 11A.2. Comparison of treatments with endogenous investment
(END) and exogenous asymmetry
FPA SPA
Bid firm 1 firm 2 firm 1 firm 2
245.70*** 86.51*** 72.10** 48.28**
Cons. (12.72) (9.95) (24.90) (24.26)
0.25*** 0.78*** 0.70*** 0.81***
Cost (0.05) (0.03) (0.09) (0.07)
111.17*** – 64.97 –
Break (22.47) – (42.97) –
0.39*** – 0.21 –
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Table 11A.2. (cont.)
FPA SPA
Bid firm 1 firm 2 firm 1 firm 2
Break*c (0.07) – (0.14) –
13.72 21.70* 30.33 26.09
END (17.40) (13.01) (31.51) (30.75)
0.03 0.06 0.15 0.11
END*c (0.07) (0.04) (0.12) (0.09)
26.67 – 130.05** –
Break*END (24.60) – (44.88) –
0.07 – 0.40** –
Break*END*c (0.07) – (0.13) –
ru 12.56 7.28 29.56 27.15
re 24.60 18.39 43.95 43.80
q 0.21 0.14 0.31 0.28
R2within 0.57 0.55 0.49 0.20
R2between 0.27 0.11 0.02 0.06
R2overall 0.50 0.51 0.38 0.17
Table 11A.3. Comparison of treatments FPA (SPA) and COMPFPA
(COMPSPA)
FPA SPA
Bid firm 1 firm 2 firm 1 firm 2
259.46*** 108.32*** 101.79*** 73.65***
Cons. (12.32) (9.36) (18.47) (18.74)
0.22*** 0.72*** 0.55*** 0.70***
Cost (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05)
101.43*** – 36.45 –
Break (20.47) – (30.87) –
0.36*** – -0.04 –
Break*c (0.07) – (0.10) –
34.88 24.48 17.02 62.38
COMP (25.93) (21.43) (43.61) (42.04)
0.10 0.07 0.03 0.18
COMP*c (0.10) (0.06) (0.17) (0.12)
11.77 – 179.68** –
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